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Turning the tide: Growth, visibility and impact of the 
civil society drug policy reform movement at the UN 
Introduction
NGO engagement in international drug control 
can be traced as far back as when the issue start-
ed being debated under the League of Nations,4 
and has been critical in shaping the trajec-
tory of policy developments ever since.5 
Starting off with only a handful of NGOs attend-
ing the Vienna-based Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs (CND) in the 1950s, civil society participa-
tion has grown exponentially in both numbers 
and breadth of expertise. 
Key international drug policy moments studied 
in this report – including the 1998 and 2016 UN 
General Assembly Special Sessions (UNGASS) on 
drugs, the 2009 High Level Segment and its 10-
year review in 2019 in particular – have created 
the momentum for civil society to engage in, and 
influence, global drug policy debates. 
The participation of a wide range of reform-mind-
ed civil society representatives – including affect-
ed communities of people who use drugs, people 
in recovery, patients using medicinal cannabis 
or essential medicines for pain relief, farmers of 
crops used for illegal drug production, formerly 
incarcerated people and others – has had an un-
deniable impact on UN drug policy events, elevat-
ing real lived experience from the ground at often 
dry and bureaucratic debates in Vienna. 
The increasingly strong and coordinated drug 
policy reform NGO movement has also brought 
to the fore the devastating consequences of 
punitive drug policies, encouraged progressive 
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governments to join forces in calls for reform, 
and supported non-Vienna-based UN agencies to 
engage in drug policy discussions. This has large-
ly contributed to the increased attention given 
to the health, human rights and developmental 
implications of drug control, culminating with the 
2016 UNGASS and its Outcome Document, and 
the adoption of the UN System Common Position 
on drugs by the heads of 31 UN agencies in 2018.
Reform NGOs have nonetheless faced many chal-
lenges along the way. These have included the 
clearly limited impact made by civil society when 
using ‘official’ channels of participation, ongoing 
resistance from both UN entities and govern-
ments which are hampering their involvement in 
UN drug policy debates, and increasingly restrict-
ed civil society space, in particular in the context 
of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
This briefing paper7 offers a historical analysis 
of civil society advocacy for drug policy reform 
at the UN, assessing the many gains made and 
challenges encountered over time – and ways in 
which reform-oriented civil society has met, re-
sisted, and generally overcome, these challeng-
es. This paper is based on desk research, discus-
sions with advocates involved in the key events 
discussed in the paper, and the lived experiences 
of the authors, and so is naturally weighted more 
to the recent moments such as Beyond 2008, the 
2016 UNGASS, the 2019 Ministerial Segment, and 
the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Part 1: 1947 to 2008
The genesis of civil society engagement 
in UN drug policy debates
As a functional commission of the UN Econom-
ic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the CND has the 
obligation to involve NGOs in its work.8 Although 
the CND has historically been a difficult space 
for NGO participation, civil society representa-
tives have been attending meetings almost since 
they began in 1947, albeit initially in small num-
bers.9 In the very early days, civil society groups 
that were active at the UN were NGOs calling 
for greater controls (from the temperance or an-
ti-opium movements) and representatives from 
the industry and commerce that sought to limit 
controls.10 
To improve civil society participation, the Vienna 
NGO Committee on Drugs (VNGOC) was founded 
in 1983,11 and the New York NGO Committee on 
Drugs (NYNGOC) the following year.12 In 1984, 26 
NGOs attended the CND.13 Numbers remained at 
Figure 1  Watershed moments for civil society engagement in global drug policy and number of NGOs 
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this level for several years,14 including in the Pre-
paratory Committee for the 1998 UNGASS (at the 
39th session of the CND).15 Regular NGO attendees 
during the 1980s and 1990s included the Interna-
tional Council of Women, the International Coun-
cil on Alcohol and Addictions, the General Arab 
Women Federation, the International Association 
of Lions Clubs/Lions Club International, the Inter-
national Federation of University Women, and 
the World Organisation of the Scout Movement. 
While participation remained steady for the fol-
lowing decade, there was a clear shift in the com-
position of civil society groups in attendance in the 
early 2000s. In 2003, Open Society Foundations 
appeared on the participants list,16 and in 2005 
Human Rights Watch attended the Commission 
for the first time17 (although both organisations 
and other civil society representatives had attend-
ed previously under different ECOSOC badges). 
The 1998 UNGASS: A crucial starting 
point for broader civil society 
mobilisation 
The policy positions of civil society organisations at-
tending the CND meetings today range from those 
advocating for a drug-free world, proponents of 
harm reduction and decriminalisation, and those 
calling for the full legal regulation of all drugs – with 
much nuance in between these positions and the 
diverse range of NGO participants, including those 
working on human rights, criminal justice reform, 
palliative care and HIV/AIDS. Although this is a rel-
atively recent development. Until the mid-1990s, 
most NGOs were focused on demand reduction ef-
forts18 such as drug prevention, treatment and re-
habilitation, towards the goal of achieving a drug-
free world. In 1996, two years before the second 
UNGASS on drugs, the Transnational Institute (TNI) 
joined the only other ‘reform-orientated’ group 
at the VNGOC – the Transnational Radical Party.19 
Both organisations joined the International Coali-
tion of NGOs, which submitted a ‘draft manifesto’ 
calling on member states to revise punitive and 
damaging drug policies.20
With timid support from some member states,21 
ECOSOC-accredited NGOs were able to observe 
all the Preparatory Committee meetings in Vi-
enna, as well as the UNGASS itself in New York. 
Space was given for six civil society interventions 
from the floor during the formal proceedings, 
including a representative from ‘producers’ and 
one from ‘consumers’. These two powerful inter-
ventions were an important achievement for the 
reform-oriented groups in 1998. The statements 
brought the realities of disastrous policies mo-
mentarily to the fore, as ‘a clear moment when 
the hypocrisy of the event became briefly appar-
ent and perceptible, even to the ones who were 
running the show’.22
Civil society representatives were able to attend 
the UNGASS side events organised by member 
states and UN agencies, and to participate in the 
open discussions following the presentations 
from the panels. However, only one NGO side 
event was held inside the UN building,23 owing to 
VNGOC concerns that controversial topics would 
antagonise the UN and member states. Instead, 
an ‘NGO Village’ was set up in the Church Center 
opposite the UN building in New York, where 
all the NGO activities took place. The NGO Vil-
lage proved to be useful for networking among 
the civil society groups. However, predictably 
hardly any of the UN and government delegates 
crossed the street to attend the NGO-led activi-
ties. Nonetheless, the 1998 UNGASS was crucial 
for mobilising civil society towards drug policy re-
form through creating alliances between people 
who use drugs, farmers, human rights advocates, 
women’s rights campaigners, cannabis activists 
and others from both the Global North and the 
Global South.
Perhaps the most significant civil society-led initi-
ative at the 1998 UNGASS was a letter to then UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annon calling for ‘a frank 
and honest evaluation of global drug control ef-
forts’ and stating, ‘We believe that the global war 
on drugs is now causing more harm than drug 
abuse itself’.24 The letter was signed by hundreds 
of distinguished and well-known individuals from 
around the world, including former presidents, 
members of congress, authors and others. Most 
significantly, former UN Secretary-General, Javier 
Perez del Cuellar, signed the letter. An initiative 
of the Drug Policy Alliance with the support of 
WOLA, TNI and others, the letter was published 
as a full-page ad in the New York Times the day 
the UNGASS opened. It became the talk in the 
corridors of the UN building, and the press con-
ference held by US ‘drug czar’ Barry McCaffrey 
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was dominated by questions about the letter, the 
signatories and the issues it raised.
The other important success by civil society 
groups at the 1998 UNGASS was the effort to en-
sure that the SCOPE Plan (the ‘Strategy for coca 
and opium poppy elimination’ by 2008) proposed 
by UNDCP was not taken forward. The plan, 
strongly supported by the USA, was originally 
meant to be the main outcome of the UNGASS. 
Preventing its adoption was one of the main pri-
orities for groups like TNI, the Washington Office 
on Latin America (WOLA), Acción Andina and oth-
ers. Thanks to this civil society effort, the SCOPE 
plan was not mentioned in the 1998 UNGASS 
outcomes and has never been referred to since. 
What remained of it, however, was the inclusion 
in the 1998 Political Declaration of the controver-
sial paragraph 19: ‘Welcome the global approach 
by the United Nations International Drug Control 
Programme to the elimination of illicit crops, and 
commit ourselves to working closely with the 
Programme to develop strategies with a view to 
eliminating or reducing significantly the illicit cul-
tivation of the coca bush, the cannabis plant and 
the opium poppy by the year 2008’.25 In a way, the 
SCOPE Plan gave birth to the targets to eliminate 
the global drug market that continue to plague 
the global drug control debate to date.26 
A few years later, and ahead of the CND in March 
2005, an unprecedented mobilisation effort saw 
over 200 NGOs from 56 countries send a joint 
letter to the CND calling on them to stand firm 
on harm reduction, noting that ‘No less than the 
future of the HIV epidemic is at stake’.27 This was 
the first mass mobilisation effort by reform-ori-
ented NGOs, and came in response to the leaked 
‘Dear Bobby’ letter28 between the UNODC Exec-
utive Director and the US Assistant Secretary of 
State that seemed to backtrack on harm reduc-
tion commitments. The mobilisation ensured that 
this story was picked up by mainstream media.29 
The ‘Beyond 2008’ initiative
Throughout the 2000s, the numbers of civil soci-
ety representatives attending the annual sessions 
of the CND steadily increased. From then on, 
the type of NGOs attending the CND started to 
change dramatically, with the emergence of ad-
vocacy groups calling for policy reform, upholding 
human rights, ensuring the centrality of health, 
promoting just and proportionate criminal justice 
responses, and highlighting structural elements 
such as the socio-economic pre-determinants 
of engagement in the drug trade. In 2006, IDPC 
was formed as a vehicle for collective advocacy 
in support for drug policy reform, providing com-
ments and analysis on the UN debates as well as 
encouraging and facilitating NGO participation in 
global drug policy discussions.30 
The increased engagement of groups from the 
harm reduction and human rights sectors helped 
to set the stage for the most visible civil socie-
ty moment to date: the ‘Beyond 2008’ initiative. 
The Vienna and New York NGO Committees, 
with support from the UNODC, set up the ‘Be-
yond 2008’ mechanism to facilitate civil society 
input into the 10-year review of progress made 
against the targets set in 1998, and to feed into 
the 2009 High Level Meeting which would lead to 
the agreement of the 2009 ‘Political Declaration 
and Plan of Action on International Cooperation 
towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to 
Counter the World Drug Problem’.31 
The ‘Beyond 2008’ process took over two years 
and culminated in a Global Civil Society Forum in 
July 2008 attended by 300 civil society represent-
atives, who all agreed on a consensus declaration 
that was formally presented to the 52nd session of 
the CND in 2009.32 The ‘Beyond 2008’ Declaration 
was a major achievement in bringing NGOs from 
across the ideological spectrum behind a consen-
sus statement. Reform-minded groups welcomed 
the commitment to harm reduction, human 
rights issues, the need for a culturally appropriate 
response, the inclusion of the most affected com-
munities, as well as improved access to controlled 
medicines and alternatives to incarceration. The 
Declaration was lauded as a ‘remarkable accom-
plishment that will impress many officials now in-
volved in the UNGASS review process as this can 
be presented as a consensus outcome of NGOs 
from all around the world and from all different 
ideological perspectives’.33 There were, however, 
concerns over the failure to meaningfully engage 
groups representing subsistence farmers of crops 
used for illegal drug production,34 an issue that 
was taken up seriously by civil society represent-
atives in the lead up to the 2016 UNGASS.35
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Part 2: 2009 to 2016
The 2009 High Level Segment: 
Unprecedented NGO participation but 
obstacles remain
Unsurprisingly following the civil society mobi-
lisation around the ‘Beyond 2008’ initiative, the 
level of NGO participation and collaboration was 
unprecedented at the 2009 High Level Segment 
– with 222 NGO representatives in attendance, 
representing 66 organisations. Compared with 
previous years, a larger number of country del-
egations included NGO representatives and ac-
ademic experts, including Albania, Georgia, Kyr-
gyzstan, Lithuania, Mexico, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, St Lucia, the UK and Ukraine. Many na-
tional delegations also started attending bilateral 
meetings with NGO representatives,38 a relatively 
new phenomenon at the time which has now be-
come the norm with various member states. For 
the first time also, a room was allocated for NGOs 
attending the High Level Segment – although in 
a different building to the main Segment. In the 
years that followed, the ‘NGO lounge’ became an 
important space for NGOs to hold formal NGO 
briefings, bilateral meetings with member states, 
meet and network, store documentation and 
simply have a space of their own in the UN build-
ing during CND sessions.
Unfortunately, no civil society speaker was able 
to speak at Segment’s plenary debate, apart 
from Michel Perron, the Chair of the Beyond 
2008 Steering Committee, who was allocat-
ed a 5-minute slot to discuss the declaration. 
And although NGOs were allotted two slots per 
roundtable (running in parallel with the general 
debate), these were relegated to the end of the 
discussions, sometimes without interpretation. 
Civil society representatives also faced a number 
of obstacles at the High Level Segment. Impor-
tantly, the ‘Beyond 2008’ declaration received 
little visibility and reflection from the main pro-
ceedings and resulting political declaration. In 
addition, there was no formal response to the 
request for a civil society hearing to be held or 
for a ‘marketplace’ to be set up for NGOs to dis-
play and share their materials. Once in the UN 
building, NGO representatives were regularly 
searched by security guides, while their publi-
cations placed on the tiny table space allocated 
for the 200+ representatives in attendance were 
regularly thrown away.39
Civil society gains official recognition in 
Vienna
Only two CND resolutions have ever been adopted 
on civil society participation – the first in 2006,40 
and the second (and last) in 2011.41 The latter was 
arguably the most contentious of that year, and 
although the final text was watered down due to 
push back from China and Russia in particular, the 
resolution was still a critical milestone.42 The fol-
lowing year, the first Informal Civil Society Hearing 
finally took place at the CND.43 The informal na-
ture of the hearing meant that no official record 
of the discussions would be kept as part of the 
CND session – reflecting the cautious attitude of 
the CND secretariat and UNODC towards NGO en-
gagement at the time. Nevertheless, this was an 
important initiative for NGO views to be heard and 
Since 2008, ‘informal dialogues’ between 
civil society and senior UN officials have 
been organised each year at the main CND 
meetings. These include dialogues with the 
UNODC Executive Director, the INCB Presi-
dent and, later on, the CND Chair and WHO 
staff. The series kicked off with a meeting in 
2008 with the then UNODC Executive Direc-
tor, Antonio Maria Costa. Unfortunately, this 
first meeting was marked by derogatory re-
marks about reform-minded NGOs,36 whom 
he would often refer to as the ‘pro-drug lob-
by’.37 The following year, Mr. Costa came to 
the dialogue accompanied with no less than 
five security guards. 
Over the years that followed, however, 
these dialogues – coordinated and chaired 
by the VNGOC – have become useful tools 
for constructive and respectful interactions 
with UN leadership, and an opportunity to 
ask difficult questions related to harm re-
duction, decriminalisation, the rights of in-
digenous groups, extrajudicial killings, can-
nabis regulation, etc.
Box 1  Informal dialogues with 
UN leadership as a tool for 
advocacy
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for governments and UN agencies to outline ways 
in which they have involved NGOs in their work.44 
At the time, although the reform community had 
made significant progress at the CND, especially 
since the 1998 UNGASS, the situation remained 
challenging. Conservative organisations primarily 
from the Global North advocating for a ‘drug-free 
world’ continued to dominate the membership 
and Board of the VNGOC since its inception, and 
the VNGOC Chair served as the sole civil society 
representative at almost all formal UN events on 
drugs. Access by the harm reduction community 
to these ‘official’ channels was tightly controlled 
and therefore severely limited. In New York, the 
picture was even more tenuous – the NYNGOC 
had become dormant after ‘Beyond 2008’, leav-
ing no formal platform for NGO engagement at 
the UN headquarters.45 The often-repeated re-
frain that ‘everything happens in Vienna’ sought 
to ensure that the UNODC would maintain its 
‘monopoly’ over drug policy issues, side-lining 
other UN agencies.  
Meanwhile, the reform NGO community was ex-
tending its network to new regions (see Figure 
2) and forging relationships with supportive gov-
ernments such as Norway, the Netherlands, Co-
lombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and even a growing, 
if somewhat tentative, relationship with the USA. 
As a result, when preparations for a 2016 UNGASS 
began, reform-oriented civil society organisations 
were well-positioned to influence the debates.
Early UNGASS preparations 
In the autumn of 2012, when the UN Generally 
Assembly set the date for the next UNGASS on 
drugs, policy reformers were awed by the sheer 
possibilities that such a meeting presented. A 
core group comprising TNI, the Harm Reduction 
Coalition (now called the National Harm Reduc-
tion Coalition, NHRC) and IDPC came together 
at the CND in 2013 to map out a plan of action. 
The main objectives were decided early on: 1) to 
raise awareness about drug policy and the reform 
community’s goals with key Permanent Missions 
and UN agencies in New York; 2) to encourage 
the participation of UN agencies in the lead-up to 
the UNGASS; and, most importantly, 3) to maxim-
ise the participation of civil society.  
In early 2013, advocacy efforts by IDPC and HRC 
with Permanent Missions in New York focused 
on following the negotiations around the drugs 
‘omnibus’ resolution. Led by Mexico, this annu-
al resolution constitutes an opportunity for the 
General Assembly to highlight the drugs issue by 
supporting existing processes and resolutions on 
drugs, and can also call on member states and UN 
agencies to take additional actions.46 In parallel, 
IDPC and HRC began engaging with various New 
York-based UN agencies, including the UN Devel-
opment Programme (UNDP), the Department of 
Political Affairs and UNAIDS, which – while sup-
portive of the drug policy agenda – lacked a strong 
mandate to fully engage in UNGASS preparations. 
Plenary session at the 54th session of the CND
Credit: Steve Rolles
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Against this backdrop IDPC, HRC and other civil 
society partners started holding events to raise 
awareness of drug policy among the UN commu-
nity in New York on topics such as the Organi-
zation of American States’ ‘Report on the drug 
problem in the Americas’,48 women and incar-
ceration, and the modernisation of drug law en-
forcement.49 Although the UNGASS was not to 
take place for another three years, these events 
were usually well attended by a wide range of 
member states, and their content provoked live-
ly discussions, setting the ground for the follow-
ing years.
Roadblocks, challenges and successes
While reform-minded civil society organisations 
were encouraged by the interest in the progres-
sive drug policy agenda shown by some member 
states, particularly from Latin America, challenges 
and roadblocks appeared early and with surpris-
ing intensity. Longstanding tensions within the 
UN system erupted when choosing between New 
York and Vienna as the venue for the preparato-
ry meetings. While civil society lobbied hard for 
New York, the ‘omnibus’ resolution of December 
2014 established that almost the entire process 
would take place in Vienna, with the President of 
the General Assembly invited to ‘support, guide 
and stay involved in the process’.50 As a compro-
mise measure, it was later agreed that a High-Lev-
el Thematic Debate would be held in New York in 
May 2015, chaired by the President of the General 
Assembly and organised under his office in coor-
dination with the CND. Progress with UN agencies 
was also difficult – without a specific mandate, 
many UN agencies were loath to infringe upon the 
UNODC’s ‘territory’. 
Tensions between New York and Vienna were 
also playing out in the NGO Committees. The 
NYNGOC leadership found that despite its sta-
tus as a substantive committee under the Con-
ference of Non-Governmental Organizations 
in Consultative Relationship with the United 
Nations (CoNGO), it had to continually fight for 
recognition and opportunities to engage in the 
process. In New York, the UNODC refused to rec-
ognise the NYNGOC, did not communicate or 
issue invitations to UNGASS briefings, and held 
out the VNGOC as the only civil society commit-
tee – a position that the UNODC continued to 
hold to this day.51 In response, reform-minded 
Figure 2  Increase in the number of IDPC members by region between January 2011 and May 202147 
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NGOs looked to civil society structures in other 
thematic areas of the UN such as migration, HIV/
AIDS, non-communicable diseases and the rights 
of indigenous peoples, to find instances of best 
practice around high-level UN meetings. This led 
to a proposal to form a ‘Civil Society Task Force’ 
(CSTF) which would combine the leadership of 
the two Committees with regional and themat-
ic representatives, thereby ensuring diverse and 
inclusive representation. Considerable effort was 
made to build support for the proposal at the UN 
headquarters in both New York and Vienna. 
In March 2014, the Deputy Secretary-General of 
the UN, Jan Eliasson, agreed to meet with a small 
group of civil society representatives at the CND 
in Vienna. By the time delegations were arriving 
in Vienna (and after a weekend of tense Commit-
tee negotiations), a small group of Committee 
members from across the ideological spectrum 
of drug policy had been assembled. Agreeing on 
the benefits of a coherent approach, the repre-
sentatives officially presented the CSTF idea to 
the Deputy Secretary-General together, as a uni-
fied group (despite ongoing resistance from cer-
tain members of the VNGOC). 
The Civil Society Task Force: A unified 
civil society front for the UNGASS
It was agreed from the beginning that the CSTF 
was to bring ‘comprehensive, diverse, balanced, 
and inclusive’ representation to the UNGASS, and 
that its members would need to set aside ideo-
logical differences to achieve the common goal of 
civil society participation. A steering committee 
was formed with two representatives from each 
Committee, chaired by the Chair of the VNGOC 
with NYNGOC and VNGOC representatives serv-
ing as co-Vice-Chairs. It was also agreed that two 
representatives from each global region would 
lead regional consultations. The unique charac-
teristic of the CSTF for the 2016 UNGASS was the 
addition of nine representatives from affected 
populations and global issues, including people 
who use drugs, people in recovery from drug 
dependence, families, youth, farmers of crops 
used for illegal drug production,56 harm reduc-
tion, drug prevention, access to controlled med-
icines, and criminal justice. In the end the CSTF 
consisted of 31 members of civil society, and was 
carefully balanced in terms of geographic, gen-
der, and ideological diversity. In December 2014, 
just eight months after the contentious civil soci-
ety meeting with the Deputy Secretary General, 
the CSTF was launched at the reconvened 57th 
session of the CND in Vienna, with the UNODC 
declaring it the ‘official’ civil society platform for 
the 2016 UNGASS.57 After over two decades of 
marginalisation by dominant ‘status quo’ forces, 
the harm reduction/reform-oriented civil society 
community had finally achieved equal footing.
Owing to the centrality of Vienna in drug pol-
icy deliberations, the VNGOC has historically 
enjoyed more visibility than the NYNGOC. 
However, both committees have a record of 
engagement, including at the June 1987 In-
ternational Conference on Drug Abuse and 
Illicit Trafficking, at the 1994 NGO World Fo-
rum on Drug Demand Reduction that result-
ed in the Bangkok Declaration,52 and when 
coordinating the NGO Village at the 1998 
UNGASS on drugs. The NYNGOC also played 
a role in the ‘Beyond 2008’ Global Civil So-
ciety Forum and the nine regional consul-
tations leading up to it.53 Yet, by 2011 the 
NYNGOC had become dormant, while the 
VNGOC took advantage of the ‘Vienna mo-
nopoly’ to develop a close relationship with 
the UNODC and the INCB, as the only func-
tioning substantive NGO committee around 
drugs until the NYNGOC was re-established 
in 2013.54
The call for a Special Session to be held in 
New York presented a key opportunity to 
revive the work of the NYNGOC, then called 
the ‘New York NGO Committee on Narcot-
ic Substances’.55 After more than a year of 
preparations, in 2013 the Committee held 
its first meeting since reforming, at the UN 
Church Center (the site of the 1998 UNGASS 
NGO Village). In attendance were 21 NGOs, 
mostly from New York and nearby states. 
One year later, an Executive Committee was 
elected comprised of organisations from Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Canada, Mexico and the USA, 
and the Committee was renamed the ‘New 
York NGO Committee on Drugs’.
Box 2  Civil society engagement 
in New York and Vienna: A tale 
of two cities
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Once formed, the CSTF sought to ensure the 
physical presence of civil society members in the 
debates. An early opportunity presented itself 
when the CSTF was called upon to select speak-
ers for the roundtable discussions in the pre-UN-
GASS segment held during the 57th session of the 
CND in March 2015. One speaker was chosen 
for each of the five roundtables on: drugs and 
health; drugs and crime; human rights, wom-
en, children and communities; new challenges, 
threats and realities in addressing the world drug 
problem; and alternative development. Notably, 
for the first time, civil society speakers’ inter-
ventions from the floor were interspersed with 
statements from member states, instead of at 
the end.58 These early discussions were a favour-
able sign for civil society participation in the UN-
GASS processes to follow.  
Another major opportunity for the CSTF came 
a few months later during preparations for the 
May 2015 High-Level Thematic Debate on drugs 
in New York. The UN machinery had reached 
out to the Chair of the Civil Society Task Force, 
Esbjörn Hörnberg (from IOGT International), to 
represent civil society in the first debate. The 
CSTF Steering Committee pushed back immedi-
ately, and Mr. Hörnberg agreed to step aside to 
allow for the CSTF to select speakers who would 
be geographically diverse and representative of 
civil society working on the ground – in line with 
the CSTF mission. Working with the President of 
the General Assembly’s Office, the CSTF selected 
two speakers through a collaborative and trans-
parent process – one from a treatment facility 
in Lebanon and the other from a harm reduc-
tion service in upper Manhattan, USA.59 Once 
again, the CSTF had shown that NGOs could 
work towards the common goal of civil society 
inclusion. NGOs from different backgrounds put 
their own interests aside in the spirit of fairness 
and balance. These early compromises built 
trust and a strong foundation for the UNGASS 
preparations ahead.
Probably the biggest success – as well as one of 
the main challenges – in the lead up to the UN-
GASS was the Informal Interactive Stakeholder 
Consultation (IISC), also held by the President of 
the General Assembly ‘with the support’ of the 
CND, in February 2016.60 Not only was civil soci-
ety able to persuade the President of the Gen-
eral Assembly to hold this controversial hearing 
(which had not been authorised by a CND reso-
lution), it was enthusiastically supported by his 
Office despite the objection of certain member 
states who would rather have kept all of the pro-
ceedings in Vienna. Further tensions followed 
when the Office of the President of the General 
Assembly and the CND Secretariat ignored the 
closely negotiated list of CSTF speakers and se-
lected a number of more conservative speakers. 
After a stressful night of negotiations to protect 
the CSTF’s mandate and push back on political 




interference on speaker selection, the original 
CSTF list was formally accepted. 
The first of its kind in drug policy, the full-day 
IISC was opened by the President of the Gen-
eral Assembly himself and featured civil society 
speakers from all over the world from people 
who use drugs and farmers of crops used for il-
legal drug production to those working in pre-
vention, treatment, harm reduction and as well 
human rights advocates.61 Over 300 civil society 
representatives attended the meeting and made 
over 50 interventions, the majority of which were 
reform oriented. With the exception of the key-
note speaker (from the Sunny Trust International 
Addiction Treatment and Rehabilitation Centre in 
Pakistan), voice after voice from the podium and 
the floor called for decriminalisation, harm re-
duction, a health-based approach, human rights, 
proportionality in sentencing and regulation, 
in the company of a moderately sized group of 
member state delegates. Best of all, every one of 
these concepts appeared in the official meeting 
summary (despite direct efforts by some UN offi-
cials to exclude these statements), which was to 
become an official UNGASS document.62 With all 
of its challenges, the IISC had marked a turning 
point in drug policy – when the messages of re-
form overtook the balance in terms of civil soci-
ety voices in the UN debates.
Growing momentum for reform 
For the drug policy reform community, the UN-
GASS was seen as a critical opportunity to shift the 
paradigm. Criticism of the system had been build-
ing up and, at the CND, the number of countries 
voicing their displeasure with the international 
drug control system was also increasing.63 IDPC 
began mobilising its membership around key ad-
vocacy messages,64 policy analysis and advice to 
government and UN officials.65 Open Society Foun-
dations (OSF), the most prominent donor of drug 
policy reform, played a critical role in rallying their 
grantees and using the UNGASS lead-up to bring 
new civil society and academic actors into the 
movement.66 The work of the reform movement 
developed around four distinct strands:
1. Bringing in more diverse civil society perspec-
tives from other sectors that had not tradi-
tionally been engaged on drug policy reform. 
This included criminal justice, development, 
palliative care, peace building, women’s rights, 
religious groups, among others. A key compo-
nent of this was to ensure that the voices of 
those most affected by drug policies could be 
heard at the UNGASS (pre-)sessions, in partic-
ular people who use drugs coordinated by IN-
PUD, farmers (supported particularly by TNI), 
and formerly incarcerated women (with sup-
port from WOLA and IDPC).
2. Encouraging other parts of the UN system to 
engage in the UNGASS process, urging them 
to consider the human rights, health and de-
velopment impacts of repressive drug policies 
that were not duly considered by Vienna-based 
drug control bodies.67 The written contributions 
and oral statements by UNAIDS, WHO, UNDP, 
Panel discussion on new challenges, threats and realities’ with Lisa Sanchez from Mexico Unido Contra la Delincuencia (on the right) as 






the OHCHR and UN Women further amplified 
the message that punitive drug policies are un-
dermining other UN commitments to health, 
human rights and development.68 
3. Supporting progressive member states to re-
balance the narrative towards health and hu-
man rights considerations. This work included 
proposing suggested language in the negoti-
ations and highlighting previously agreed UN 
language on key issues.69 Meetings for groups 
of like-minded states were convened outside 
the UN setting and the pressure of consensus, 
to find common ground and ways for moving 
the discussions forward.70 NGOs also played 
a key role in connecting the debates across 
the UN settings – between Vienna, Geneva 
and New York and then back to capitals. The 
collaborative nature of the reform-minded 
NGOs, facilitated by IDPC and others, engen-
dered transparent information-sharing and 
encouraged member states to be consistent 
and more coordinated in their messaging in 
different UN forums.
4. Media outreach and communications to build 
public support for drug policy reform. This 
work aimed to translate the more technical 
policy ‘asks’ of reform NGOs into engaging mes-
sages for the public and the media. OSF fund-
ed the Museum of Drug Policy in New York – a 
pop-up cultural hub that held a full programme 
of events that ran for the same days as the UN-
GASS. A public rally was also organised outside 
the UN building, which marked the end of the 
journey for the ‘Caravan for Peace, Life and Jus-
tice’71 which had travelled through El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Mexico and the USA, highlighting 
the human costs of the ‘war on drugs’ on its 
route. A joint coordinating umbrella campaign 
called ‘Stop The Harm’72 was set up to bring to-
gether the diverse drug policy campaigns and 
initiatives, and the Drug Policy Alliance coordi-
nated a letter to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon urging him to set the stage ‘for real re-
form of global drug control policy’, which was 
signed by more than 1,000 prominent individ-
uals from all over the world.73 Finally, the Sup-
port. Don’t Punish campaign, launched in 2013, 
was instrumental in coordinating joint messag-
es for reform under a common banner in the 
lead up to the Special Session.74
Part 3: 2016 to 2019 
UNGASS 2016: Highlights and challenges
For many civil society participants, the 2016 UN-
GASS was a once-in-a-lifetime event. The main 
highlight was the calibre and diversity of civil so-
ciety representatives who had been chosen to 
speak. Eleven speakers in total from all around 
the world were selected – two for each of the 
five roundtables (one on the panel and one 
speaking from the floor) – and five more in the 
plenary session. This time, there were no sweep-
ing challenges from member states to the CSTF’s 
Families uniting to end the war on drugs in front of the UN building in New York
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recommended list, but the changes came more 
slowly, trickling in, as the regional representatives 
for member states were chosen by the Office of 
the President of the General Assembly – if there 
was a need for geographical diversity, it was in-
variably the civil society representative who was 
called on to be ‘flexible’ and taken off the panel. 
A prolonged moment of tension surrounded the 
selection and last-minute de-selection of the star 
civil society representative on the human rights 
panel: Ricky Gunawan, an Indonesian human 
rights lawyer representing defendants facing the 
death penalty for their involvement in the drug 
trade. His work represented everything the re-
form community was fighting for. In his stead, an 
Indonesian governmental representative was to 
appear. Ricky was still slated to make an interven-
tion from the floor, and when he was called on 
to speak, a hush fell over the room as all of civ-
il society rose to their feet in silent solidarity. As 
Ricky spoke about his work with people who had 
been arrested on drug offences and had spent 
years on death row, some suffering from mental 
illness, some who had died at the hands of his 
government, member state delegates also began 
to silently stand. When he finished the crowd 
delivered a solid, prolonged applause. It was a 
profound triumph for civil society – the voices of 
the community had been heard.75 Other speak-
ers – from Brazil, Costa Rica, Ghana, India, Ken-
ya, Myanmar, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Puer-
to Rico, Senegal, Slovenia and the UAE – were 
also outstanding, making powerful, poignant 
statements and pleas for better, more compas-
sionate treatment of people who use drugs, 
farmers as well as respect for human rights, sus-
tainable livelihoods and the need to approach 
the issue through a public health lens. 
There were many other challenges at UNGASS, 
the most obvious being the logistical issues NGOs 
faced from the moment they arrived at the UN 
Headquarters in New York. There were not enough 
passes the day preceding the UNGASS and hun-
dreds of NGOs were shut out of the Civil Society 
Forum. The first day of the UNGASS was no better 
as issue after issue ensued on account of an ex-
tremely haphazard pass system. Countless NGO 
delegates were unable to attend the opening of 
the UNGASS, including half of the CSTF Steering 
Committee. NGO representatives who had trav-
elled from all over the world to attend were even 
denied access to the overflow room and ended 
up stuck in the hallways. Later, some civil society 
representatives could not attend the side events 
they had been asked to speak in for lack of a spe-
cial pass needed to attend each of these events. 
Member states who had sponsored the events 
had not been informed that they were to provide 
passes for each event, and directions issued by 
the UN days before the meeting were in direct 
conflict with what transpired on the day. Further, 
despite repeated requests, no table space for lit-
erature had been provided as is customary at UN 
events (and had been provided in 1998). Several 
NGOs also reported having their materials con-
fiscated by security – including a t-shirt that said 





‘cannabis is safer than alcohol’ and a pamphlet 
on cannabis regulation. When confronted, UN of-
ficials shirked responsibility and blamed commu-
nications issues. It was incredibly frustrating that, 
after months of planning and coordination by the 
CSTF to ensure access for civil society, such an un-
fortunate chain of events had unfolded.
On the substantive aspects of the UNGASS ne-
gotiations, it was clear to reform-orientated civ-
il society groups that the UNGASS preparatory 
process had been neither inclusive nor transpar-
ent.76 All the negotiations were held in the form 
of ‘informal’ meetings rather than official ‘inter-
sessionals’, which excluded civil society observ-
ers. In response, IDPC coordinated a letter signed 
by 195 NGOs and circulated at the 59th Session 
of the CND in March 201677 to express the con-
cern that the UNGASS process had failed to be 
the ‘wide-ranging and open debate that consid-
ers all options’ that had been called for by UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon in 2013.78 The let-
ter also heavily criticised the inability of member 
states to recognise the ‘lack of progress achieved 
by international drug control over the past 50 
years’, alongside the failure ‘to acknowledge the 
damage caused by current approaches’.79 
The role of civil society in bringing to the fore the 
many harms caused by punitive drug policy was 
nonetheless recognised by the President of the 
General Assembly. In his closing remarks, Mogens 
Lykketoff, concluded: ‘With your experience and 
expertise, you have brought home to us the im-
mense human cost of this problem and indeed, 
at times, of the approaches we take to address it’. 
He also acknowledged that affected populations 
‘need interventions that have proven to work and 
perhaps as importantly: they need honesty about 
those that have failed’.80 It was an unprecedented 
admission of the failure of drug control policies in 
the highest possible UN setting.
The aftermath of the UNGASS: Assessing 
wins and failures 
Many NGOs had come into the UNGASS process 
with open eyes on what could indeed be achieved 
at the Special Session, knowing full well that pro-
gress would be difficult, and any win would require 
a significant amount of time, patience and effort. 
The immediate aftermath of the UNGASS was 
nonetheless marked by disappointment through-
out the drug policy reform movement. The Global 
Commission on Drug Policy led the charge, hold-
ing a press conference the day after the UNGASS, 
calling the Special Session a failure and a missed 
opportunity.81 IDPC also sent out a press release 
highlighting the many gaps in the UNGASS Out-
come Document.82 Overall, many civil society ob-
servers felt dissatisfied with the whole process and 
the fact that, once again, member states had failed 
to leverage a key opportunity to fundamentally 
change the course of drug policy. 
However, those that had closely followed the UN 
debates for over a decade or more eventually 
recognised that a major shift had indeed been 
achieved,83 and this was in many ways made pos-
sible thanks to sustained and strategic civil socie-
ty advocacy. The year following the UNGASS was 
therefore spent analysing both wins and failures 
of the UNGASS and civil society advocacy strat-
egies, and reassessing negative perceptions of 
an Outcome Document which was relatively for-
ward-looking and contained progressive language 
on human rights, health, harm reduction, access 
to controlled medicines, proportionate sentenc-
ing, gender and development.84
Looking back at lessons learned in civil society ad-
vocacy, the UNGASS demonstrated that civil soci-
ety actors could have a real impact on the tone of 
the debate. Strategic advocacy efforts that chime 
with the objectives of progressive member states 
can bear fruit. It is clear, however, that some the 




has been through reform advocacy efforts out-
side of the official civil society mechanisms – for 
example through closed informal dialogues with 
like-minded government officials and direct per-
sonal communications, as well as through media 
pressure. Unfortunately, the hard-fought-for prod-
ucts of the official civil society mechanisms, such 
as the report of the IISC or the civil society survey 
report of the CSTF,85 were never formally submit-
ted as part of the UNGASS preparations – and 
influencing the debates through official channels 
was a serious challenge. That being said, the CSFD 
succeeded in opening up spaces and ensuring 
wide civil society participation at the UNGASS.
For reform-orientated civil society organisations, 
great strides were made in the decade leading up 
to the UNGASS. Much of this success was built 
on increasing international solidarity, shared ob-
jectives, collaboration and networking. The drug 
policy reform movement, while still relatively 
young, had gained in strength, diversity, visibility 
and credibility – and the momentum of the UN-
GASS was a major catalyst for this to happen. The 
media outreach and public engagement around 
the UNGASS also ensured that drug policy reform 
increasingly became one of the key social justice 
issues of the times, and new actors from different 
disciplines and sectors were joining the calls for 
change. This provided solid and fertile ground on 
which to continue to grow the movement in the 
lead up to the 2019 Ministerial Segment.
The lead up to the 2019 Ministerial 
Segment 
2019 marked the expiry of the 10-year targets 
agreed in the 2009 Political Declaration and Plan 
of Action on drugs: to ‘eliminate or reduce sig-
nificantly and measurably’ illicit drug cultivation, 
trafficking, consumption and money laundering.86 
The post-UNGASS period was marked by a sense 
of diplomatic fatigue, with reluctance from mem-
ber states to embark on yet another lengthy and 
difficult search for consensus. The turnover in 
diplomats based in Vienna also meant that new 
delegates – many of whom did not have the his-
torical legacy of UNGASS negotiations or strong 
expertise on drugs – were now involved in the 
negotiations around the Ministerial Segment and 
its Declaration. 
In response to this challenge, civil society once 
again played a major role in mobilising like-mind-
ed member states, to avoid rolling back on the 
progress made at the UNGASS. The first role for 
civil society was an educational one – offering 
institutional memory and knowledge to new 
delegates. This was done via informal meetings, 
briefings to Vienna Missions, side events at the 
CND, and through the publication of reports and 
briefings that clearly laid out the wins of the UN-
GASS and the importance of protecting them in 
2019.87 The more visible discussion on improved 
data collection and the need for new metrics and 
indicators – at the core of which laid the revision 
of the Annual Report Questionnaire (ARQ) – was 
another avenue for civil society advocacy.88 As 
reform NGOs had done during the negotiations 
of the UNGASS Outcome Document, they provid-
ed constant feedback on the negotiations of the 
Ministerial Declaration. 
Delineating the format of the 2019 
Ministerial Segment
While civil society organisations were still assess-
ing UNGASS wins and failures, they also started 
to consider the possible objectives, format and 
outcomes of the 2019 event. The IDPC network 
quickly called for a robust, scientific evaluation 
of the past decade of drug policy, as well as a 
transparent and inclusive consultation to inform 
the elaboration of a new timeframe beyond 
2019. Looking at past UN review processes used 
in 1998 and 2009, IDPC proposed concrete rec-
ommendations on how such a review could be 
conducted.89 For IDPC, the 2019 event needed to 
be a genuine debate on the state of drug policy, 
considering all options (as had been called for 
by Ban Ki Moon in the lead up to the UNGASS) 
and involving all relevant actors – including all 
member states, all relevant UN agencies, and 
civil society.90 
The idea of an independent review of global 
drug control was met with considerable resist-
ance from both the UNODC and member states, 
perhaps reluctant to conduct an evaluation that 
would inevitably shed light on the devastat-
ing failure of the past 10 years of drug control. 
Meanwhile, the negotiations of the modalities 
for the high-level event – and whether to give 
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prominence to the 2009 Political Declaration or 
to UNGASS Outcome Document – became the 
new battlefield between conservative and pro-
gressive member states. 
Under the leadership of the Norwegian and Mex-
ican Ambassadors acting as successive Chairs of 
the CND, member states agreed to ‘convene a 
ministerial segment open to all States Members 
of the United Nations and interested stakehold-
ers’ at the 62nd session of CND in March 2019.93 
The subsequent CND ‘modalities resolution’ in 
2018 stated that the two roundtables would each 
include a civil society panellist, and explicitly 
mentioned the CSTF for the first time ever.94 
Reconvening of the Civil Society Task 
Force
As the discussions on the modalities of the Min-
isterial Segment started in 2017, it seemed clear 
that the important progress made on the balance 
and structure of civil society organisation around 
the 2016 UNGASS had to be retained and built 
upon. The CSTF was reconvened for the Ministe-
rial Segment after more than a year of negotia-
tions, with the VNGOC and NYNGOC Chairs now 
installed as Co-Chairs of the Task Force. The CSTF 
itself was expanded to comprise 35 members – 
with an additional representative for ‘Alternative 
Development’ and an expanded Steering Com-
mittee charged with leading on communications, 
outreach and fundraising.95 
As had been the case in preparations for the 
UNGASS – and using the good working rela-
tionships they had forged with UN delegates 
– reform-minded civil society groups were ac-
tively engaged in the discussions that shaped 
the 2019 Ministerial Segment. The EU came to 
play a critical role in UN discussions on drugs – 
and the EU Civil Society Forum on Drugs (CSFD 
– the expert group of the European Commis-
sion focused on drug policy issues) therefore 
came to be a strategic vehicle to deliver rec-
ommendations on the Ministerial Segment. As 
with the CSTF at global level, the CSFD includes 
NGOs focusing on all aspects of drug policy, and 
reflecting different ideological perspectives.91 
The CSFD had already built strong ties with 
the EU in the lead up to the UNGASS, offering 
inputs and recommendations throughout the 
negotiations. The Forum took on a similar role 
for the Ministerial Segment, providing key in-
sights to the EU and its member states on the 
format and outcomes of the Segment, as well 
as on the negotiations of the Declaration.92 It 
was certainly positive that many of the inputs 
from the CSFD were reflected in the official po-
sitions of the EU throughout the process, and 
the transparent and constructive relationship 
was strengthened between the CSFD and the 
EU during that period.
Box 3  The EU Civil Society Forum on Drugs as a vehicle  
for advocacy






In parallel, the balance within the VNGOC itself 
was significantly shifting, with more and more 
reform-minded NGOs becoming members, and 
elections in March 2018 that saw a representa-
tive from the reform community (Jamie Bridge 
from IDPC) elected as the VNGOC Chair for the 
first time in its history.96
As it had done in preparations for the 2016 UN-
GASS, the CSTF played a major role in the lead 
up to the Ministerial Segment, coordinating and 
fundraising for the participation of dozens of civil 
society speakers to participate in each themat-
ic CND intersessional meeting in the autumn of 
2018, bringing the voices of those most affected 
all over the world to the discussions held in Vien-
na. This vibrant civil society engagement in the 
proceedings, however, was not welcomed by all 
member states. Indeed, some powerful civil so-
ciety statements raising human rights concerns 
associated with repressive drug policies were 
met with strong opposition from various member 
states. One of the most shocking incidents hap-
pened when the Chinese delegate broke all rules 
of diplomacy by interrupting the representative 
from Amnesty International who was discussing 
the issue of the death penalty. Why, the Chinese 
delegate demanded, should we discuss human 
rights in a session relating to supply reduction? 
Problematically, this criticism was echoed by vari-
ous conservative member states (all, it should be 
noted, supporters of capital punishment97), but 
was thankfully met with statements from several 
progressive delegates in support of the civil soci-
ety speaker.98 The next day, the same Chinese del-
egate asked the panellist from the Eurasian Harm 
Reduction Association whether she was herself 
using drugs.99 Although these forms of disrespect 
and intimidation are now rare occurrences in 
official CND debates, it underscored the contin-
ued resistance met by civil society in Vienna, and 
thankfully did not go unremarked in the corridors 
by more supportive member state colleagues. 
For its official contribution for the Ministerial Seg-
ment, the CSTF once again coordinated a global 
civil society consultation. Gathering feedback from 
461 NGO respondents from 100 countries and ter-
ritories, the consultation collected information on 
the views of NGOs around progress made since 
the adoption of the 2009 Political Declaration 
and the UNGASS Outcome Document, and how 
their work aligned with the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals.100 The report of the consultation was 
launched at two interactive Civil Society Hearings 
entitled ‘Voices of Civil Society: Beyond 2019’ and 
held in Vienna101 and New York102 in early 2019, 
with support from Mexico and Switzerland. Al-
though the preparatory sessions and actual Seg-
ment were all held in Vienna, the CSTF considered 
that a hearing in New York would help keep the 
drugs issue on the political agenda as a follow up 
to the 2016 UNGASS. Both hearings featured a 
range of interventions from civil society experts 
from around the world, focusing on the role that 
civil society could play in responding to drug-relat-
ed challenges beyond 2019, with most messages 
– as had been the case for the UNGASS IISC – pro-
moting reform. The results of the consultation and 
Hearings were published as an official CND Con-
ference Room Paper (submitted by Switzerland), 
forming part of the official documentation for the 
Ministerial Segment,103 the first time for civil socie-
ty and reflecting a lesson learned from the previous 
CSTF experiences.
Defining civil society asks for the 
Ministerial Segment
Building upon the strong momentum created 
by the UNGASS, the IDPC network mobilised yet 
again to come up with a new set of ‘policy asks’ 
that would inform the advocacy efforts of the re-
form-oriented NGO movement throughout the 
Civil society hearing in Vienna, February 2019
Credit: CSTF
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2019 process.104 Through strategic meetings (in-
cluding a civil society dialogue in Berlin in Febru-
ary 2018) and a series of online consultations, the 
following asks were agreed:
While some of these asks were similar to those 
developed for the UNGASS105 (i.e., ending punitive 
approaches, promoting harm reduction, moving 
away from drug-free targets), the priorities with-
in the reform movement had both matured and 
shifted since 2016. Key priorities now included the 
need to understand the implications of drug policy 
on the UN overarching goals of protecting and pro-
moting health, human rights, development and 
peace and security. This, no doubt, was a result of 
the expanding and diversifying reform movement 
which, by then, included NGOs focusing on a wide 
array of human rights, feminist, health, develop-
ment and social justice issues. The key objective 
for the Ministerial Segment, from a civil society 
perspective, was to force member states to take 
drug policy out of its silo and truly consider how 
their drug control strategies truly contributed to 
– or undermined – broader UN priorities, such as 
the achievement of the SDGs.
The 2019 Ministerial Segment: 
Successes and challenges
Overall, efforts to influence the Ministerial Dec-
laration paid off. In a difficult political environ-
ment, reform civil society were more visible and 
coordinated than ever in Vienna. Although now 
in minority, the progressive member states did 
manage to push back on the problematic lan-
guage proposed by conservative delegations, and 
remained strong in the negotiations until the very 
end – with constant support from civil society. As 
had been the case when the UNGASS Outcome 
Document was adopted, many civil society rep-
resentatives – including IDPC – were dissatisfied 
with the final version of the Ministerial Declara-
tion.106 The reiteration of the goals of ‘continue to 
work towards the eradication’ of the illegal drug 
market was especially disappointing.107 Never-
theless, civil society working in collaboration with 
progressive member states had succeeded in re-
sisting harmful language targeting countries that 
had adopted legally regulated markets, as well as 
the explicit reiteration of article 36 of the 2009 
Political Declaration on the eradication goals.108 
The latter in particular was a major win as it was 
the first time in decades that these goals had not 
been included in a high-level declaration. The pro-
gressive front had also ensured that the more for-
ward-looking elements of the UNGASS had made 
it into the final text – recognising the importance 
of human rights, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development and other key issues. Furthermore, 
and possibly one of the most important wins for 
reform NGOs, the ‘stocktaking’ section of the 
Declaration includes a lengthy paragraph listing 
the many ‘persistent and emerging challenges re-
lated to the world drug problem’ – as had been 
clearly highlighted in IDPC’s Shadow Reports. This 
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was the first time that member states had gen-
uinely acknowledged the many failings of their 
global efforts to tackle drugs, including in the 
areas of access to controlled medicines, rates of 
drug morbidity and mortality, and human rights 
challenges.112 This paragraph is now proving to be 
instrumental in the follow up to the discussions in 
Vienna, as the CND established a four-year work 
plan (2019-2023) to review each of the ‘challeng-
es’ highlighted within this paragraph in turn.113 
In 2018, faced with the vacuum of any mean-
ingful official evaluation of the impacts of global 
drug policy over the past 10 years, civil society 
played a critical role in filling this blatant gap – 
by producing its own analysis of the past dec-
ade of drug control. The resulting IDPC ‘Shad-
ow Report’ assessed progress made against 
the 2009 ‘eradication’ targets, but also vis-à-vis 
the broader UN priorities of protecting human 
rights, advancing development, and promot-
ing peace and security109 – in line with the pol-
icy asks that the network had developed a few 
months before. Reviewing UN data, academic 
research and civil society analysis, the report 
painted a damning picture of the past decade of 
global drug control. The levels of drug cultiva-
tion, trafficking and consumption had reached 
record highs in 2018, while punitive drug con-
trol efforts had resulted in catastrophic health, 
human rights, security and development conse-
quences for affected communities worldwide. 
As various Asian governments had ramped 
up their war-on-drugs approach, IDPC also 
produced a Shadow Report documenting the 
specific impacts of drug control in the region,110 
while civil society colleagues from Colombia 
published their own analysis, using the model 
of these reports, to call the attention of their 
government on the severe impacts of punitive 
drug control.111
The reform movement worked togeth-
er to bring the findings of the Shadow Re-
ports to policy makers and to the media. 
This coordinated push to global media en-
sured that the Ministerial Segment was 
now under the spotlight, and so was the 
catastrophic impact of the past 10 years of 
UN drug policy. These civil society reports 
became a key advocacy tool, leaving mem-
ber states with nowhere to hide – and with 
data they could no longer ignore – as they 
embarked in CND intersessional meetings 
in the autumn of 2018 to take stock of the 
situation and initiated the negotiations 
for a consensus-based resolution on the 
way forward. 
Box 4  Taking stock of the past decade of drug policy






The Ministerial Segment itself involved a ple-
nary thematic discussion, as well as two round-
tables, the first one dedicated to ‘taking stock’ 
of the implementation of past commitments,114 
and the second on ‘safeguarding the future’.115 
The Chair of the VNGOC was amongst the first 
speakers to take the floor at the opening ses-
sion of the Ministerial Segment, before member 
states and even prior to the video statement 
by the UN Secretary-General.116 Unfortunately, 
no other civil society speaker was able to make 
an intervention during the plenary as more 
than 100 government speakers had requested 
the floor, with debates lasting until late in the 
evening on both days of the segment. As man-
dated by CND Resolution 61/10,117 and follow-
ing a global open call, the CSTF selected one 
panellist and two alternates for each of the two 
roundtables. The civil society speakers from Co-
lombia, Lebanon, Nigeria, Russia, Singapore and 
Slovakia addressed an array of topics such as 
harm reduction, prevention, the role of families, 
experiences drawn from the past decade, and 
recommendations for the future. 
Civil society voices were also prominent in side 
events held at the Ministerial Segment, with five 
of the 12 events organised in collaboration with 
civil society (two of which with the CSTF), and 
most benefiting from at least one NGO presenta-
tion.118 Throughout the Ministerial Segment, the 
key role played by civil society was highlighted by 
38 member states119 – interestingly, both from the 
progressive and conservative sides – as well as 
various regional groups120 and UN agencies.121The 
importance of involving civil society, the scientific 
community and academia in drug policy was also 
included as one of the ‘salient points’ coming out 
of the roundtable discussions,123 as well as being 
reflected in the Ministerial Declaration itself.
Towards UN systemwide coherence on 
drug policy
The UNGASS had been a catalyst for key UN 
agencies to start considering drug policy as an 
issue of concern within their respective man-
dates. After the Special Session was over, how-
ever, there were fears among civil society organ-
isations that the gains made in 2016 to promote 
more coherent drug policies within the UN sys-
tem as a whole, might be lost. Several heads or 
key staff members of UN agencies had been re-
placed, and the process for UN agency involve-
ment in the 2019 Ministerial Segment discus-
sions remained nebulous. 
The Ministerial Segment and its preparatory 
meetings benefited from strong engagement 
from UN human rights and health agencies – 
with support and encouragement from civil so-
ciety. The OHCHR in particular was present and 
outspoken at each and every one of the CND 
intersessionals held in preparation for the 2019 
Segment. This, however, was not to the taste of 
some member state delegates (Russia in par-
ticular) which openly criticised the more regu-
lar engagement of the OHCHR representative in 
the drug policy debates.123 With inputs from civil 





society, various UN Special Procedures released 
statements throughout the Ministerial Segment, 
highlighting human rights concerns in drug con-
trol relating to women,129 people of African de-
scent,130 drug courts131 and arbitrary detention.132 
Meanwhile, UNAIDS used the opportunity of 
the high-level event to launch its report ‘Heath, 
rights and drugs: Harm reduction, decriminaliza-
tion and zero discrimination for people who use 
drugs’ – with a strong message in favour of de-
criminalisation and ending stigma.133  
Yet another important initiative showcasing the 
strong collaborative relationship – and align-
ment of messaging – between civil society and 
UN agencies, the International Centre for Human 
Rights and Drug policy, UNAIDS, the WHO and 
UNDP launched their ‘International guidelines on 
human rights and drug policy’134 at the Ministerial 
Segment.135 The Guidelines were later on also en-
dorsed officially by the OHCHR. The first of their 
kind in this area of work, the Guidelines offer 
concrete recommendations on how to enshrine 
human dignity and sustainable development at 
A sliver of hope came in 2017 with the nomi-
nation of a new UN Secretary-General, António 
Guterres, who had been Prime Minister of Por-
tugal when the country decriminalised drug 
use. His background in the field of drug policy, 
as well as his plans for UN reforms were seen 
as key opportunities for reform-minded NGOs. 
And he did not disappoint. Although the new 
Secretary-General has remained surprising-
ly timid in his statements on issues related to 
harm reduction and drug policy reform, he led 
on – and delivered – a milestone for the drug 
policy reform movement.
In November 2018 the UN System’s Chief Exec-
utives Board for Coordination (CEB), under the 
Office of the Secretary-General, released the 
‘Common position on international drug con-
trol policy through effective inter-agency col-
laboration’.124 One of the key objectives of the 
Common Position is for the UN family to ‘speak 
with one voice’ on drug policy. Critically, the 
Common Position includes strong recommen-
dations in favour of harm reduction, decrimi-
nalisation and alternatives to imprisonment. 
This was a major step forward in improving UN 
coherence on drug policy, a move that civil so-
ciety – and IDPC in particular – had been pro-
moting for over a decade. Indeed, the ground-
work for the establishment of the Task Team 
and adoption of the common position was laid 
out over many years of advocacy and efforts,125 
with undeniable progress made ahead of the 
2016 UNGASS, including with the creation by 
the UN Secretary General of the ‘UN System 
Task Force on Transnational Organized Crime 
and Drug Trafficking’ (known as the ‘TOC Task 
Force’) in 2011. The TOC Task Force facilitated 
the active participation of many UN agencies 
in the UNGASS process, some which had never 
engaged in drug policy issues.126
In 2018, a ‘UN system coordination task team 
on the implementation of the UN system com-
mon position on drug-related matters’ was es-
tablished and is now led by the UNODC. Un-
fortunately, after the production of a landmark 
report in March 2019, ‘What we have learned 
over the last ten years: A summary of knowl-
edge acquired and produced by the UN system 
on drug-related matters’,127 the Task Team has 
mostly remained silent. The UNODC has been 
particularly reluctant to promote the Common 
Position or play an active role in coordinating 
the Task Team, and omitted any reference to 
the document in its Strategy for 2021-2025.128 
Since 2018, it has therefore been largely 
thanks to civil society that the Common Po-
sition and its Task Team have remained a key 
focus for debates, with reform NGOs pushing 
for its dissemination via events in Geneva and 
Vienna, encouraging member states to include 
wording on the Common Position in CND and 
omnibus resolutions and in their statements at 
the CND, and holding the UNODC accountable 
for the lack of efforts made to date in leading 
the Task Team. 
Box 5  The UN System Common Position on drugs
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the centre of government drug control respons-
es on issues ranging from development to crimi-
nal justice to public health. The Guidelines were 
developed through extensive consultations be-
tween member states, UN agencies and civil so-
ciety experts.
Part 4: 2020 to April 2021
The 2020 CND: Vocal calls for reform 
continue
2020 was largely marked by the COVID-19 pan-
demic, which inevitably impacted upon civil so-
ciety advocacy at all levels of governance. The 
63rd session of the CND in March 2020 was the 
last major UN event held face-to-face before the 
world went into lockdown. Due to uncertain-
tyIndeed. over the spread of, and risks associat-
ed with, the virus, many delegates from capitals 
cancelled their trip to Vienna, only a handful 
of resolutions were proposed for negotiations, 
and a number of side events were cancelled at 
short notice. 
Interestingly, however, civil society participation 
in the 2020 session was as high as ever, with a re-
cord 93 registered ECOSOC-accredited NGOs, and 
496 civil society representatives in attendance 
(only six less than in the previous year). NGO par-
ticipation in the CND Plenary was as vibrant as 
ever, with no less than 18 civil society statements 
delivered over the course of the week, and an 
unsurprising focus on the WHO cannabis sched-
uling recommendations which were eventually 
put to a vote a few months later, in December 
2020. The NGO dialogues with the heads of the 
UNODC, INCB and CND were overall fruitful and 
constructive and, for the first time, civil socie-
ty representatives were also able to meet with 
WHO representatives.136 
The COVID-19 pandemic strikes: 
Shrinking civil society space
Post-March 2020, all UN meetings moved to a vir-
tual setting, with restrictions on travel and gath-
erings drastically impacting on the traditional 
ways in which civil society had been advocating 
for drug policy reform at the UN. This presented 
opportunities, but also major challenges for civil 
society space.
The first opportunity for NGO participation pre-
sented itself at the occasion of the online launch 
of the UNODC World Drug Report in July 2020. 
This was encouraging, in particular because the 
virtual setting enabled the live participation of a 
civil society speaker from the Global South, in-
stead of the usual NGOs based in New York. Virtu-
al events also meant that they could be webcast 
more easily, enabling a broader audience of civil 
society participants. Physical location would no 
longer be an impediment to civil society partici-
pation at the UN.
Things turned sour, however, as member states 
established the modalities for their discussions on 
the WHO recommendations on the rescheduling of 
cannabis. The recommendations were subjected 






to prolonged and difficult debates prior to the ad-
vent of the COVID-19 pandemic. At the 2020 ses-
sion of the Commission, the CND agreed to hold a 
series of discussions prior to the vote in December. 
In May, the CND Chair proposed a new format for 
these events, labelled as ‘topical meetings’, rath-
er than using the usual intersessional format. The 
end result was the exclusion of civil society from 
the discussions. This was met with considerable 
criticism from civil society, many of which felt that 
the pandemic was being used as an excuse to 
justify the exclusion of NGOs from long-awaited 
debates on international cannabis control – and 
a dangerous precedent for future CND meetings. 
The compromise was the holding of an interses-
sional meeting in September 2020 to summarise 
the findings of the topical meetings, and allow civil 
society to participate in the discussions.137 At the 
December meeting, NGOs were able to watch the 
session live via Webcast, but were unable to travel 
to Vienna due to ongoing restrictions. 
The 64th session of the CND presented another 
key challenge for civil society – how to ensure that 
NGOs would have a virtual seat at the table. The 
VNGOC played an important part in ensuring civil 
society participation at the first ever main virtual 
CND session. After lengthy discussions with the 
CND Secretariat – made all the more difficult as 
all eyes were set on the Crime Congress, held just 
one month before the CND – the VNGOC issued 
a position statement in March 2021 with clear 
recommendations on civil society participation at 
the 2021 CND.138 In the end, the CND Secretariat 
fulfilled most of the VNGOC requests. 
158 slots were allocated out of the 750-1,000 in 
the ‘Interprefy’ platform where NGO delegates 
were able to watch the Plenary session live, see 
all participants and send them direct messages. 
This also enabled connected NGOs to watch the 
negotiations of the resolutions, although without 
knowing who was in the ‘room’ or the possibility 
of contacting them. The rest of the NGOs were 
able to watch the whole Plenary via webcast 
translated into all UN languages (in the past, only 
the CND Opening session of the CND and interses-
sionals were webcast). NGOs were secured three 
slots to make statements on each agenda item 
at the Plenary. These could be delivered either 
live or as a pre-recorded video, and the VNGOC 
once again played a critical role in coordinating 
these statements, ensuring geographical, gender, 
thematic and ideological balance throughout the 
week. Finally, the informal dialogues with the 
UNODC, CND, INCB and WHO were held virtu-
ally, continuing the tradition of these important 
events for civil society.139 
Here again, the fact that the CND was held virtu-
ally meant that civil society representatives who 
had never been able to come to Vienna could have 
their voice heard, and could follow the proceed-
ings. At the closing of the CND, a joint statement 
by the VNGOC and the NYNGOC called on the CND 
to allow some virtual format to continue for future 
sessions in an effort to ensure more inclusiveness 
IDPC pre-CND orientation meeting, March 2020
 Credit: Steve Rolles
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and transparency in the proceedings.140 Howev-
er, the move to an online setting also meant that 
NGOs had to drastically change their advocacy 
strategy in order to engage in the CND discussions. 
Instead of the usual face-to-face meetings, reform 
NGOs reached out to government delegates via 
emails, WhatsApp messages, webinars and infor-
mal online briefings. Civil society collaboration 
and coordination also moved online, with pre-CND 
strategy meetings and discussions to maximise 
participation and impact on the CND debates and 
negotiations. Despite the best efforts to influence 
the debates, however, meaningful engagement re-
mained difficult as face-to-face interactions at the 
CND remain critical in influencing the overall de-
bates, both at the UN and at national level.
Conclusion
A historical analysis of civil society involvement 
in international drug policy debates has showed 
how the reform movement has grown, diversified 
and become more vocal and recognised over the 
past two decades, culminating with the 2016 UN-
GASS on drugs, which was a watershed moment 
for the crystallisation of the reform community. 
Increased coordination, joint strategising and 
messaging have enabled reform NGOs to join forc-
es, share experiences, build on lessons learned 
from past advocacy, and maximise our impact at 
UN level. NGO coordination mechanisms such as 
the VNGOC, the NYNGOC, the CSTF and of course 
IDPC, have been instrumental in facilitating such 
coordination among NGOs, and in improving civil 
society participation at the UNGASS, the CND and 
other UN drug policy events. 
The momentum created by key moments such 
as ‘Beyond 2008’ and the 2016 UNGASS enabled 
advocates to strengthen the movement and seek 
news avenues for advocacy. Facing one challenge 
after the other, the reform movement has con-
stantly reinvented itself, drawing from the wide 
range of experience and expertise of the IDPC 
network and other partners, in order to overcome 
issues like restrictions on civil society space, push 
backs on human rights, losses of key allies due to 
changes in political leadership at national level, 
diplomatic fatigue after major global events, and 
much more. 
Despite this undeniable process, however, ma-
jor challenges remain. The COVID-19 pandemic 
has understandably led to strict restrictions on 
travel and gatherings. But there is also a risk that 
the pandemic is being used by governments and 
the UN alike to roll back on critical steps forward 
made over the past decades to ensure civil soci-
ety engagement in international drug policy. The 
pandemic has also underscored pressing chal-
lenges for the drug policy reform movement: 
how can civil society hold governments account-
able for the ongoing prisons crisis, how can we 
continue to raise awareness of the serious health 
consequences of the funding crisis for harm re-
duction, how can we ensure that the media draws 
attention on the egregious human rights abuses 






that continue to be perpetrated in the name of 
drug control in countries like Brazil or the Philip-
pines, and how can we encourage more donors 
to fund drug policy reform in a context of restrict-
ed budgets and with all attention turned towards 
addressing the global pandemic?
As the drug policy reform NGO movement is look-
ing for new avenues for advocacy in this ‘new 
normal’ which may last well beyond COVID-19, 
these challenges, as well as protecting civil soci-
ety space at all levels of governance, will remain 
pressing issues in the years to come. 
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